Not Carnality but Incarnation

A discussion of spiritual embodiment in Flannery O’Connor’s “A Temple of the Holy Ghost.”

One half-century ago, Flannery O’Connor made dinner conversation with Mary McCarthy. The conversation turned on the Eucharist and Ms. McCarthy, who had left the Church at fifteen, said she thought of it as a symbol and implied that it was a pretty good one. Ms. O’Connor answered in a shaky voice, “Well, if it’s a symbol, to hell with it.”[1] The writer thus declared her faith in the doctrine that Eucharistic bread becomes the real Body of Christ. In so doing, she simultaneously recalled another tenet of Catholic spirituality: the Incarnation, the belief that God became Man in the person of Jesus Christ. Both the Eucharist and the Incarnation (from incarnare, “to make flesh”) place special value on the physical expression of the divine and give rise to O’Connor’s view of spiritual embodiment. The story “A Temple of the Holy Ghost” (1954) develops this view of embodiment by linking it to language. Characters who use language more effectively better understand the role of the body in spiritual life. Through these characters, O’Connor critiques religious discourse that forgets about the body, at the same time that she expands a discourse that only connects the body with sex. By focusing on marginal figures who cannot have sex – children, nuns, and a hermaphrodite – O’Connor forwards a truth that is more universal than the sexual act. Spiritual embodiment holds that every body is holy, a locus where the sacred and the material converge.

Catholic thinking undergirds all of O’Connor’s writings, but “A Temple of the Holy Ghost” is that rare story where Catholic rhetoric becomes an active variable. Joanne and Susan are fourteen years old and not especially pretty, built like string beans and blushing in purple patches when they laugh. They attend a convent school; otherwise, the story makes clear, they would do nothing but think about boys. Now they have come to stay for a weekend with their second cousin (whom O’Connor refers to simply as “the child”) and their aunt. Somehow they have adopted the habit of calling each other Temple One and Temple Two, and when asked to explain, the girls breathe out through a fit of giggles that Sister Perpetua, the oldest nun at the Sisters of Mercy, has lectured them on the Holy Ghost. Sister said that if a young man should “behave in an ungentlemanly manner with them in the back of an automobile,” they should holler, “Stop sir! I am a Temple of the Holy Ghost!” and that would settle everything (238).[2] The child, unlike her cousins, does not react to the idea in hysterics. Instead she repeats the phrase to herself – I am a Temple of the Holy Ghost – and it pleases her. Her attraction to the mystery of sacred language contrasts sharply with her cousins’ vanity and “twaddle” (247). Eventually a couple of boys – short, thin boys, future preachers in the Church of God – come by the house and take Joanne and Susan to the carnival. When they return late at night, they wake the child and tell her what they saw: a “freak,” a hermaphrodite in a tent, calling out to the crowd, “God made me thisaway” (245). The child, mesmerized by the image, tries to meditate on it; and the next day, as she visits the convent and kneels before the Eucharist, she keeps on reciting the hermaphrodite’s refrain: “This is the way [God] wanted me to be” (248).

Now, in all of this, we see one truth and multiple interpretations of it. The truth of the story is its title, which calls the body a temple of the divine. O’Connor argues that this truth must be understood inextricably from the Catholic notions of the Incarnation and the Eucharist, since when God became Man, and gave His Body as food, He made the body a holy place and an indivisible component of identity. Both Catholic doctrines invoke themes of unity and self-sacrifice, and without these themes, the truth of the body is disfigured. O’Connor uses silly girls, their wiry beaux, and an old-fashioned nun to expose the ways in which the body becomes divorced from unity and self-sacrifice, and thus the ways in which spiritual embodiment is misunderstood. At the same time, she gives us a precocious child and a hermaphrodite to recover a deeper understanding of the “temple” truth. As O’Connor once said, “The Incarnation makes us see the grotesque as grotesque.”[3] Abject and marginal figures draw attention to their corporality, thereby offering an alternate discourse which prioritizes the role of the body in religious experience.

We can easily locate the origins of unity and self-sacrifice in the Catholic tradition. As to the latter, the Incarnation teaches that God so loved the world that He gave his only begotten Son, as a sacrifice to atone for human sin. Christ’s death on the cross in turn is recalled in Eucharistic imagery (“an elevated Host drenched in blood” (248)), which appeals to the belief that God gives up His Body for His people. Indeed, churchgoers witness this theme of self-sacrifice during the Mass, when the events at Calvary are re-presented and God becomes so humble as to take the appearance of bread and wine. Then, when churchgoers receive the sacrament, they literally accept Christ into their bodies. The divine, in other words, enters into the human body and the human body is conformed to the divine. This picture of union mirrors the intimacy of the Incarnation, through which God united humanity and divinity, temporality and eternity. In both cases, the body stands as a locus for union and communion with the divine; it is not something that is supposed to be transcended or disjointed in the pursuit of a higher life.

When the ideals of unity and self-sacrifice fail, the ability to understand spiritual embodiment likewise falters. Intuition tells us that nuns and girls at a convent school and future preachers would be in a good position to understand these Catholic ideals. Yet these are the very characters O’Connor singles out for critique. Perhaps it is precisely because of their proximity to a religious framework that these characters are most in danger of misusing it. So when Joanne and Susan “put on lipstick and their Sunday shoes and [walk] around in the high heels all over the house,” passing the mirror to look at their legs, they misappropriate a religious trope (236). Instead of using their Sunday attire to glorify God in church, they bedizen themselves to preen and admire their own reflections, creating a spectacle of self-glorification. They effectively breach the themes of unity and self-sacrifice that the Incarnation and the Eucharist demand. Unity fails because the girls have severed a material sign (Sunday attire) from its spiritual signification (humble respect), and self-sacrifice yields to self-satisfaction as bodies become, not gifts offered to God, but objects of vain amusement. In a similar misuse of religious tradition, Sister Perpetua quotes St. Paul’s injunction that the body is a temple of God as a defense mechanism against lusty men. For her, the Scripture invokes an ontology of sin, since to even mention the body is to suggest sex, and to suggest sex is to imply the possibility of sexual deviance. Like O’Connor, she acknowledges that the body is a sacred vessel, but unlike O’Connor, she renders this truth in a context of triviality and division. The nun’s language – she says to yell out “Stop sir!” at an unwanted advance – demeans a solemn truth, undermining the importance of the body by wrapping it in silly terms. What is more, Sister Perpetua emphasizes division over unity, using the idea that the body is a spiritual temple as a way to separate good and proper girls from their prurient suitors. This perspective misses O’Connor’s message of spiritual embodiment, which sees all bodies as holy and thus in union with each other.

Perhaps the problem for Sister Perpetua, and for the other characters who misconstrue embodiment, is a problem of translation. Michel Foucault says that the discursive impulse is what gives sexuality its power and meaning, and that language is bound up tightly with knowledge. By this logic, a misuse of language – or a bad translation – brings a heavy consequence, namely, impoverished knowledge. So when Sister Perpetua translates St. Paul into her own imperfect project, she obscures the path to truth. And Joanne and Susan, who giggle too often to even produce much language, are called “stupid” and “silly” time and again. In perhaps the most revealing example, their boy-friends Wendell and Cory appear as “big dumb Church of God ox[en]” when they mistake a Latin hymn for “Jew singing” (241).  They cannot translate the foreign tongue and summarily miscategorize it. Their alternative is to make a hybrid rhetoric of their own, rejecting traditional music for “a hill-billy song that sound[s] half like a love song and half like a hymn” (240). O’Connor implicitly criticizes the boys’ inability to find power in language and renders their attempt at bridging the spiritual and the earthly a pathetic failure. The hybrid verse breaks the rule of unity and separates experience into parts. The boys assemble two genres in a piecemeal way, picking and choosing from each which elements (like emotive response) they will keep, and replacing a sacred hymn about the mystery of the Eucharist with a pastiche of religion and “dog-like loving” sentiment (240). Ultimately, they parse and interpret religion to serve their own ends, “keeping [their] head[s] tilted upward as if [they] were only interested in hearing [themselves]” (240). These characters have been clumsy with language and, in the absence of unity and self-sacrifice, their understanding of embodiment has suffered accordingly.

The connection between language and spiritual embodiment becomes clear in one description of the Incarnation. St. John writes: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God…. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us” (John 1:1; 14). Scripture puts divinity, language, and bodily presence into a fundamental relationship. Here, God is embodied in Holy Writ and the parts are inseparable: God, Word, flesh. Language plays a similarly vital role in the celebration of the Eucharist, for it is only by the action of the divine Word – the priest says some prayers proper to the Consecration – that the elements of bread and wine truly become the Body and Blood. Particular words, often from Scripture, possess an active principle. They make things happen and they assume a tangible form, “dwelling among us.” They are not merely symbols, just as the Eucharist, as O’Connor insisted to Mary McCarthy, is not simply a sign. Instead, holy words acquire a presence of their own; when used properly, they reinstate the importance of the body in experiencing the divine.

It is therefore unsurprising that O’Connor associates greater language facility with a deeper understanding of spiritual embodiment. As we have seen, unthinking boys and a wizened nun misappropriate religious language and in the process discard the themes of unity and self-sacrifice that are so important to the truth of the body. But if one discourse fails, an alternative discourse survives in the language of the child and the hermaphrodite and revives embodiment ideals. This alternative discourse privileges a literal and inclusive reading of Scripture. The hermaphrodite, for his/her part, insists that when St. Paul calls the body a temple of the Holy Ghost, the apostle is addressing everyone. Thus the hermaphrodite can say “This is the way [God] wanted me to be” (245) because his/her own body, although “freakish” in the popular discourse, is a holding-place for the divine. Indeed, the mystery of the hermaphrodite’s body – “the answer to a riddle that [is] more puzzling than the riddle itself” (245) – in some ways parallels the divine mysteries of the Eucharist and the Incarnation. After all, the hermaphrodite represents a form of union, joining male and female organs in one flesh. This hybridity differs from the hybridity of the song-making boys, since it is naturally ordained (“God made me thisaway” (245)) and preserves a sense of unity. The hermaphrodite is not described as “half-man/half-woman,” but as “a man and woman both” (245). The wholeness of his/her identity remains intact. In a similar way, the Eucharist conveys that Christ is present whole and entire in each of the species and whole and entire in each of their parts, in such a way that the breaking of bread does not cause division. We cannot understand the hermaphrodite apart from unity and the hermaphrodite cannot understand his/her body apart from Scripture. Only holy language can accommodate his/her personhood, transforming the hermaphrodite from an “it” and a “you-know-what” (244) to an embodiment of divine will.

If the hermaphrodite uses Scripture to understand him-/herself, the child uses the hermaphrodite to understand Scripture. In particular, the hermaphrodite becomes a way for her to comprehend St. Paul’s message in a way that her cousins do not. The child absorbs the Biblical language in its deepest sense; she does not laugh over it or interpret it according to narrow personal whims. She takes the Bible at its word and understands that every body – including the hermaphrodite’s – must be holy. In general, her acceptance of  holy language is simple, and this simplicity becomes a route to truth. When she sings the “Tantum Ergo,” she feels her “ugly thoughts” stop and begins to realize “that she [is] in the presence of God” (247). So again, a simple meditation on traditional religious language (in this case, a medieval hymn written by St. Thomas Aquinas) leads to a greater sense of intimacy with the divine.

But the child does not only borrow language from existing sources. She also produces her own language and, in the process, recognizes a difference between good and bad discourse. When for instance she kneels before the Eucharist, she prays: “Hep me not to be so mean…. Hep me not to give her so much sass. Hep me not to talk like I do” (247, emphasis added). In conversing with God, the child laments her tendency to “sass” her mother and speak unkindly. She wants to overcome “the sin of Pride” (243), and the way to do this, she thinks, is through changing her language. Therefore language becomes the subject and desire of her prayer. The child is unlike her chattering cousins and the lecturing nun in her very awareness of words. When she speaks, she orients her language toward God, not toward flirtations or warding off ungentlemanly boys in the backs of automobiles. In this way, she shares a vocabulary with the hermaphrodite, who also speaks in a language of prayer, invoking the name of God. In fact, the child and the hermaphrodite are linked in an imaginary dialogue, since the former hears the words of the latter and repeats them in her head. She even imagines a detailed conversation in which the hermaphrodite becomes a preacher-figure, espousing the truths of his body to a public chorus of “Amen” (246). O’Connor’s marginal characters co-create an alternative discourse centered on spiritual embodiment.

This alternative discourse invokes the old theme of self-sacrifice, consistent with the Catholic tradition. Dreaming about what she will be when she grows up, the child tosses aside the possibilities of doctor and engineer, instead exclaiming that she wants to be a saint and a martyr (243). Meanwhile, the hermaphrodite struggles to accept his/her grotesque biology and proclaims that, despite the difficulties, “I’m making the best of it” (245). The child fantasizes about giving up her body in a gesture of religious surrender; the hermaphrodite endures his/her body in deference to divine will. Both characters offer their bodies – and by extension, their selves – to serve a higher Power. O’Connor capitalizes on such self-surrender by giving neither the child nor the hermaphrodite a proper name. Unlike Joanne and Susan and Wendell and Cory, the child and the hermaphrodite move beyond themselves. In advancing an alternative discourse, they also adopt alter(native) egos, or rather, anti-egos, to which no names can be attached.

Leo Bersani appears to embrace a similar premise in his notion of self-shattering. He identifies the ego as the source of power struggles and advocates for freedom by way of self-destruction. For Bersani, self-shattering is a way to experience the fullness of pain and pleasure. It is in a sense a masochistic variety of self-sacrifice which finds its primary expression in the sexual act. By this view, bodily sensations become the pure and ultimate goal and any concept of the person as a whole entity is lost. But O’Connor’s Catholic perspective complicates Bersani’s theory. While the body remains important, sensations of pleasure and pain cannot be ends in themselves; for after all, the body coexists with and derives meaning from the spirit. Sometimes, bodily sensations cease to function at all. As the lyrics of “Tantum Ergo” suggest, sensuum defectui: senses fail in the face of a holy and self-sacrificial mystery. Pleasure and pain are mere shadows of an encounter with the divine; they are like faulty symbols trying to express the ineffable. For O’Connor, self-sacrifice does not mean a spatial and anonymous narcissism, as Bersani would have it. Rather, self-sacrifice is a special encounter with intimacy whereby the self – body and spirit – is deeply valued, not discarded. When Jesus gives his Body in the Mass, he makes of Himself a gift of love. And when the child hears that she is a Temple of the Holy Ghost, it makes her feel “as if somebody had given her a present” (238). The body is linked with the joy of giving and receiving in love. Spiritual embodiment is self-giving, not self-obliterating.

Bersani’s view of self-shattering depends on the sexual act. But O’Connor’s spiritual embodiment extends the value of the body beyond sex per se. In fact, O’Connor does not write a single married couple into “A Temple of the Holy Ghost.” Instead, she populates her narrative with people who cannot have sex for one reason or another. So what happens to the sexual act? The child’s sensual experience of the Eucharist, in which she sees the sun as a Host drenched in blood and sinking out of sight, recalls a vision of the saints. In the mystic tradition, saints have used sexual language to describe the relationship between the soul and God. Bernini’s famous sculpture of The Ecstasy of St. Teresa suggests that sexual energies can be sublimated toward a purpose other than sexual intercourse and procreation. In the stories of the saints, a sexual tradition emanates from people who are almost exclusively celibate. Likewise, in O’Connor’s story, a celibate child provides a sexual language, rich in images of “smother[ing]” hugs (248) and sleeping with lions (243) and “muscle[s] strained” in the effort to understand a divine mystery (245). The physical body has a sublime expression apart from the act of sex and a celibate lifestyle can ably accommodate this expression in its discourse.

Celibacy might in fact even be a necessity for the production of good language. O’Connor once remarked in a letter: “There is a great deal that has to either be given up or be taken away from you if you are going to succeed in writing a body of work. There seem to be other conditions in life that demand celibacy besides the priesthood.”[4] In this understanding, celibacy is a discipline and a sacrifice uniquely tied to the act of writing. When we consider that “The Temple of the Holy Ghost” is narrated, if indirectly, from the child’s point of view, we might see the child’s celibacy as a necessary condition for her linguistic prowess. Perhaps celibacy, in O’Connor’s view,  enables the virtue of purity (an inversion of Bersani’s theory that sex keeps the body “clean” of power struggles). When applied to language, purity strips utterances to their most powerful essence, driving away frivolity and unwarranted interpretations. Hence do we see the child and the hermaphrodite embracing a simple discourse. They do not embellish, but accept fully the statement that “You are a Temple of the Holy Ghost.”

Celibacy, however, poses a problem. It inspires the anxiety of reproduction. O’Connor’s story oddly coheres with Lee Edelman’s discourse on a queer sexuality, insofar as it tries to separate the value of the body from the capacity to procreate. By including the hermaphrodite as a proto-queer archetype, O’Connor also opens “bodily discourse” to people on the margins, just as Edelman writes on behalf of homosexuals. But O’Connor, unlike Edelman, does not try to define sex as a chiefly pleasurable act. Nor does sex become her primary concern. Instead, O’Connor tries to define the body as important and holy without reference to sexual intercourse. Moreover, she does not agree with Edelman’s conclusion that the child-figure should be killed. Indeed, “The Temple of the Holy Ghost” endorses quite the opposite view, depicting as it does an exemplary child. O’Connor’s protagonist, who is “about a million times smarter” than her cousins (245) and deeply aware of sacred language, affirms Peter Coviello’s notion of a smart and capable youth. Surely the child has received some measure of Wisdom, which, according to the Bible, is a Gift of the Holy Ghost. And as a writer, she might even be said to reproduce. If words become flesh, then narration becomes a way to incarnate without the mediation of sex. Thus the child-narrator embodies characters and ideas via her language. Killing the child per Edelman’s advice would necessarily kill the body, not in an act of self-surrender to the divine, but in a coercive drive to extinguish and condemn. To kill the child would undermine the whole point of O’Connor’s story, defiling the physical and bringing disunion. The Incarnation and the Eucharist give every person a value, irrespective of age or creed or sexual orientation. This value is inextricable from the body, which exists in relationship to God and which is, indeed, a Temple of the Holy Ghost.

[1] From a letter written by O’Connor to a friend. As recorded in Yardley, Jonathan. “The Writer Who Was Full of Grace.” Washington Post 6 July 2005.

[2] Parenthetical references in this paper will refer to the story “A Temple of the Holy Ghost,” as published in Flannery O’Connor: The Complete Stories. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971.

[3] As remembered in a lunchtime lecture at a Jesuit university in San Francisco, given by Archbishop George Niederauer.

[4] As referenced in Having Our Way: Women Rewriting Tradition in Twentieth-Century America. Ed. Harriet Pollack. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1995.

Diachronic Identity in the Third-Person Autobiography

Roland Barthes thinks the pronoun “he” is the “nastiest word in the language.” It is the “pronoun of the non-person, it annuls and mortifies its referent; it cannot be applied without uneasiness to someone one loves.” What a strange challenge, then, to tell an autobiography in the third-person, making a non-person out of the person we know best. When J. M. Coetzee narrates Boyhood, he uses the “he” and the present tense to create a diachronic identity: two selves which are simultaneously entwined and disjoined.

We associate autobiography with the first-person. “I” is an appropriate and honest pronoun because it supports the one-to-one alignment of narrator and protagonist. After all, J. M. Coetzee writes about J. M. Coetzee; and is not Mr. Coetzee one and the same man? Using the third-person breaks this alignment and separates selfhood. It asserts that, indeed, the Coetzees are separate figures: one an author function or narrator and the other a story character. Boyhood emphasizes this difference by using strictly impersonal pronouns, calling the protagonist “he” and “himself” but never “John.” We usually say that employing the third-person increases journalistic merit, infusing a sense of fact and objectivity into the narrative. But autobiography presents a special case. Why would we doubt a narrator’s ability to access interiority and personal details when he is telling about his own life? Using “he” instead of “I” seems awkward, even disingenuous: splicing apart the self by way of verbal cues. It denies the referent and removes an outer shell of personhood.

But Coetzee, in his concern over the split identity, implies that even first-person narration is dishonest. In fact, using the “he” might better reflect the notion that, narratologically, it is hard to recount the truth. The young Coetzee of Boyhood exists as one entity, with a unique set of emotions and biases and perceptions; the old Coetzee who narrates exists as another, with a separate set of mental constructs. The latter must render the former through the filter of memory. But perfect reproduction is not possible, because time and situation and the vagueness of recollection intervene. Therefore, the first-person makes a promise it cannot keep: namely, that we can inhabit fully our past selves.

Coetzee’s narrative choices more accurately represent the nature of memory. An older self and a younger self exist together in the present tense, as a sign of their inevitable connection. Meanwhile impersonal pronouns remind us of a divide. Although events unfold in the present, the narrator has no control over them. He cannot make decisions in real-time because real-time belongs to the level of story, not to the level of discourse. Using “I” suggests agency and an ability to change the course of events. Using “he” reminds us that memory consists, not in changing and determining, but observing what came before. Therefore Coetzee creates a strange sort of diachronic identity: a common verb tense establishes a principle of simultaneity, which third-person language then splits into two. It is the phenomenon of being an outsider to oneself. Psychology calls this depersonalization; Barthes calls it the affliction of the “non-person” pronoun.

We see this same double identity written into the syntactic ambiguity of “he.” When the narrator names multiple characters in the space of a paragraph, referents can become unclear. He says: “Even before he knew his father, that is to say, before his father returned from the war, he had decided he was not going to like him” (43). We imagine that Coetzee is doing the deciding and that his father is the unlikeable one, but overlapping pronouns permit other interpretations. “He” erases the distance between two characters and collapses separate identities into a single person. Indeed, Coetzee likes cricket and rugby and the United Party, just as his father does (43). Yet “he does not like his father.” Common interests and common pronouns signal a common identity. But the pronouns are anonymous and impose distance: they suggest that the father is absent, that in some sense he and the young Coetzee are strangers. Identity bifurcates once more to reveal two people with so many lines of affiliation who yet remain quite unlike and apart. The third-person summarily brings people together, only to show us how imprecisely they coexist.

Barthes says that the “he” is also epic, and Coetzee’s narrative affirms this view. For although the events he describes are ordinary (a boy goes to school, talks with friends at recess, and delights in riding a bicycle), the way he describes them borrows from epic conventions. Coetzee often refers to figures from antiquity. He “becomes” a Roman Catholic because he admires “Horatius and his two comrades, swords in their hands, crested helmets on their heads, indomitable courage in their glance” (20). He meditates on desire and lust through comparisons to “Daphne pursued by Apollo; Persephone ravished by Dis” (56). These are the people who influence his life; and to a degree, they dictate the stature of his experience. As a result, school canings become great and terrifying events, inspiring shame that might befit a fallen “prince” (12); and the young Coetzee envisions his death more than once. Mindful of such a high purpose (“That is what he would like to be: a hero” (25)), the narrator fits his story into the form of an epic, with all the trappings of grandeur and difficulty and rites of passage. And so again, diachronic identity becomes important. The young Coetzee, transitory and fragile being that he is, becomes immortalized in a story. His personal “I” becomes a universal “he,” the marker of an archetype or representative figure; and his experiences become the cardinal functions of a plot. This is what it means to write autobiography, after all. For the man who tells about his life makes it important enough to transcribe and endure in time. And in so doing, he generates a new and narrativized self – like the self that is telling, but not the same – and bestows it to the generations.

Humility and Milton’s Poetic Identity

The invocation opening Book 9 of Paradise Lost is a difficult piece of text, fraught with problems of identity. Here, Milton struggles with his dual identification as poet and Christian, and strives to reconcile lofty poetic ambitions with his place in the universal hierarchy of being. At its essence, the struggle is a search for humility, and Milton directs his efforts toward understanding the implications of this virtue. It is a perversion of humility, after all, to squander personal talents, to pretend that they do not exist; but how can a man exploit his talents without running into pride and delusions of grandeur? For Milton, the answer lies in the fact that personal talents are in truth not so personal, insofar as they do not originate in the person; instead, they come from God, and it is to God that man owes any successes he may enjoy. Therefore does Milton invoke heavenly help, without which he is an old and tired poet, unsuited for carrying out the great objectives of his poem. But his humble dependence on the divine does not always appear by so clear a light. For, indeed, sometimes Milton seems to play the part of God – becoming not simply author, but Author of creation – and thus trespasses against the very foundations of humility. In his epic, Milton marvels at man’s unique relationship with the divine as modeled by his first forebears, Adam and Eve. But he also examines the relationship at a local level, probing the limits of his own poetic identity and discerning where, precisely, he stands relative to his Creator.

The Christian soul cannot forget humility, for it is a virtue which figures most importantly in his religion. Humility is the essence of the first Beatitude (“Blessed are the poor in spirit”), and those who possess it shall be given “the kingdom of Heaven” (Matthew 5:3). Let us consider for a moment the history of humility in human discourse. In the Middle Ages, imagery of the Seven Deadly Sins was widespread and dominated lay conceptions of theology. Pride was considered to be the gravest of the Sins, for pride meant pretending to Godliness and risked alienating man from his Master. But one does not avoid sin by simply dwelling on its demerits; rather, one must displace sin by filling the mind with thoughts of good. Therefore did medieval church officials proclaim a set of seven virtues to oppose the well-known vices, advancing “humility” as the counterpoint of pride. We may thus think of humility as anti-pride, or meek acceptance of man’s place as a creation of God. Thus defined, humility appears as a solution to the problems encountered in Paradise Lost: in the context of, first, the error of Adam and Eve, and second, the troubling questions of Milton’s own identity. Concerning the first, we must remember that Eve ate of the forbidden tree because the serpent promised her: “ye shall be as gods, / Knowing both good and evil as they know” (9.708-709).[1] In other words, Eve ate of the forbidden tree, and provoked the fall of mankind, because of pride, a pretending-to-Godliness. Humility would have required respect for God’s authority and obedience to His commandment, permitting of no opportunity to fall from grace. To reach this conclusion – to recognize humility as at least a partial antidote to man’s fallen state – leads naturally to the question: What is the place of humility in my own life? It is this question which underlies Milton’s search for poetic identity and serves as the matter of our discussion.

What is the place of humility in Milton’s life? We have said that humility is anti-pride, or being careful not to usurp God’s authority as Creator of all. But humility can be a nuanced, and at times difficult, concept. For while it means avoiding pretensions to divinity, it also remembers that humans are children of God, bearing traces of the divine; while it means taking store of human frailty, it also recalls that there is dignity in being named a creation of God. It is only false humility that denies a particular asset and hides it under a frowzy exterior, calling it a sin, for example, to be successful in studies or career or athletics. Thus it is wrong to say that Milton “must dismiss his superior writing talents, since it would be vain and proud to make a show of them.” For we must see that his talents come as a gift from God, and by exercising them properly, he glorifies God, not himself.[2] Milton acknowledges this inheritance by way of several invocations in Paradise Lost. At one level, the invocations act as a common epic convention, borrowed from the writings of poets like Horace and Homer, who called on the classical muses to guide their poems. But Milton’s muse belongs to a higher order than the figures of mythology. It is true that, when he speaks of his “celestial patroness” (9.21), he refers to Urania, the muse of astronomy. Yet he insists that it is “the meaning, not the name I call” (7.5), reminding us that “Urania” means “the heavenly one” and thus that his muse, so designated, is a divine power: if not God the Father, then the fruit of His Spirit and Wisdom (indeed, Milton describes Urania as the sister of Wisdom (7.9-10)). Milton says that his muse “inspires / Easy my unpremeditated verse” (9.23-24, emphasis added), and if we consider the etymology of inspireto breathe in – we see clear connections to the Holy Spirit, that member of the Trinity who is called also the Breath of Life (John 20:22). A heavenly power breathes into Milton the stuff of his verse, “bring[ing] it nightly to [his] ear” (9.47).

How easy seems this process of divine inspiration! The muse “deigns / Her nightly visitation unimplored” (9.21-22) and “dictates” (9.23) to Milton lines of verse. Even the syntax of the invocation betrays a fluid grace. Most often, lines are heavily end-stopped and full of clauses; Paradise Lost is famous for its intricate grammar. But when Milton speaks of his muse, the verse becomes suddenly quick and rolling. Let us read, for example, the following:

If answerable style I can obtain

Of my celestial patroness who deigns

Her nightly visitation unimplored

And dictates to me slumbering or inspires

Easy my unpremeditated verse[.] (9.20-24)

Five lines of verse uninterrupted by punctuation: what a rare occasion! There is something whole and beautiful about divine inspiration, something enjambed, unbound by the severe constraints of human grammar. For counter-reference, let us look at a passage in the invocation which talks of chivalrous jousts, the subject of epic literature prior to Milton:

… or to describe races and games,

Or tilting furniture, emblazoned shields,

Impresas quaint, caparisons and steeds,

Bases and tinsel trappings, gorgeous knights

At joust and tournament … (9.33-37)

Here, the trappings of humanity – in particular, those which serve to decorate and make a pomp of mankind – are given in catalog, spliced by commas, and stopped with heavy consonant sounds. We may almost call the language distrustful: for it begins, then stops, as if unwilling to proceed, then begins, only to stop again. Can we not hear in these lines a reminder of Eve’s hesitation before the serpent, and the jolting rhythm of life that had to accompany the fall? The sound of the verse is sympathetic to its sense.

Now, even human industry, presumably so noble, cannot attain the same heights as heavenly things in their easy poise. Adam and Eve must toil after the fall, laboring as never before, but they remain banished from Paradise. Milton likewise recognizes the limitations of human toil in writing verse. He says that he is neither “skilled nor studious” (9.42) of certain subjects, yet still may his verse hope to succeed. This is because “higher argument / Remains sufficient of itself” to raise the epic to a sound morality (9.42-43); that is to say, the divine content of Paradise Lost, and not Milton’s role in penning it, redeems and elevates the poem. In these examples, Milton appears more stenographer than author proper, receiving and transcribing “dictate[d]” (9.23) words rather than fashioning them from his own imagination. This quality – of receiving rather than creating – is important, for it rests on humility. It recalls that man is “but the brush in the hand of the artist, and nothing more” and goes on to query: “what is a brush good for if it doesn’t let the artist do his work?”[3]

But here we come to a complicated distinction, for while God is Artist, Milton makes his living in the human realm by the same title: he is author, poet, artist. So who holds the brush? Sometimes it seems that Milton makes so bold as to hold it. It is true that he invokes the help of Heaven and admits that, “if all be mine” (9.46) and not the work of God, then his verse will surely fail – but even so, his humility falters. Subtle clues in his language point out the inconsistency. When, for example, Milton laments the fallibility of his verse – “unless an age too late, or cold / Climate, or years, damp my intended wing / Depressed” (9.44-46, emphasis added) – he also casts himself among the angels with his vocabulary: he gives himself a “wing.” And when Milton opens his invocation, he presents a hierarchy of the universe, but syntactically excludes himself from its chain of descent:

No more of talk where God or angel guest

With man, as with his friend, familiar used

To sit indulgent and with him partake

Rural repast, permitting him the while

Venial discourse unblamed; I now must change

Those notes to tragic … (9.1-6, emphasis added)

We observe how the lineage naturally moves from God to angel to man in the course of a sentence; but when the I of Milton’s own self arrives, it is set apart from the previous logic by a semicolon. Presumably Milton (like Socrates in the famous syllogism) is a man, and so assumes his proper place in the universal hierarchy beneath God and celestial beings. But the syntax of the verse suggests that Milton belongs to a separate category from, not a subcategory of, mankind.

It is especially germane that the action ascribed to Milton’s I is active and authorial: “I now must change / Those notes to tragic” (9.5-6). He no longer appears to receive wisdom from on high; instead, he willfully introduces tragedy; he changes the course of the narrative and, in parallel, the course of human history. What power is his! Appropriately, he depicts himself as omnipotent. He claims knowledge of all the universal spheres, writing of Earth and Heaven as though they were weights on a balance: “foul distrust and breach / Disloyal on the part of man, revolt / And disobedience; on the part of Heaven, Now alienated, distance and distaste” (9.6-9, emphasis added). And through his verse rings the bell of judgment: he writes of “just rebuke” (9.10) and determines his poem to be “not less but more heroic” (9.14) than its predecessors. Is not judgment a faculty generally reserved for God (think of the Final Judgment prophesied in the Bible)? By declaring such authoritative opinions, Milton takes on the absolute character of the divine, at least in part. Indeed, it is sometimes unclear whether Milton means to refer to himself or to a heavenly power; as when, for example, he writes: “[The muse] dictates to me slumbering,” and leaves slumbering with an unclear referent (9.23).  He is caught between his identity as human author, Christian author, child of God; and his aspirations to a higher, capital Authorship.

Throughout Paradise Lost, Milton examines the relationship of man to the divine generally, in the narrative of Adam and Eve; but also particularly, in a study of his own identity. Underlying both levels of analysis is a conflict between pride and humility. The latter would give all credit and authority to a higher power and accept God as supreme Author. In his invocations, Milton makes several gestures of humility and proclaims his lowly place in the universal hierarchy. But the gestures coexist with opposite linguistic cues, which blur the borders between Milton’s existence and God’s. If we recall that the etymology of inspire is to breathe in, we can perhaps think of the conflict as a problem of breath. If Milton depends on heavenly help, and acknowledges the necessity of his dependence, then his verse is divinely inspired: breathed in with life. But if, instead, he overreaches, and aspires to an Authorship that is not his, then the poem becomes bloated, too puffed up with pride.

[1] References are made using the following text: John Milton, Paradise Lost (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005). Numerals indicate Book, then line number. E.g., 9.708 reads “Book 9, line 708.”  

[2] A nice way of thinking about this concept is seen in the 20th-century novelist James Joyce, who would write at the top of his paper “AMDG,” the initials of the Latin phrase meaning “For the greater glory of God.”

[3] The quotation is taken from The Way, a seminal collection of meditations by the saint, and founder of Opus Dei, Josemaría Escrivá. See Josemaría Escrivá, The Way (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 106.

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